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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the influence of institutional investors on 
share prices using data from companies quoted on the Athens Stock Ex-
change. For finance theorists the value of an investment, real or financial, is 
a function of its expected benefits and the riskiness of these benefits. What-
ever influences are exerted by the structure of equity ownership are diversi-
fied away by efficient risk-averse investors. Managerial and agency theorists 
argue that the particular ownership structure may have an effect on share 
value or returns. Their arguments are based (mainly) on the consequences of 
the separation of ownership from control. In addition to traditional methods 
of estimation we have used Chamberlain’s (1982) multivariate panel data 
estimator, which allows for arbitrary patterns of error autocorrelation and 
parameter temporal behavior. Among all alternative methods of estimation 
used, only this one produced a statistically significant and econometrically 
well specified relationship between share prices and institutional sharehold-
ings. 
1. Introduction 
Researchers wishing to determine the extent to which stock price market 
behavior can be explained by theoretical valuation constructs have tested a 
number of empirical valuation models
1
. All extant empirical valuation mod-
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els implicitly assume that equity ownership structures are value irrelevant. 
More specifically the distribution of shares among managers, individual 
shareholders, institutions, block-holders and others does not exert any appre-
ciable influence on share prices. Yet a number of influential theoretical 
works conclude that the structure of equity ownership may be a variable with 
value relevance within the framework of an empirical valuation model
2
. In 
this paper we investigate the value relevance of ownership distribution on 
share prices with data from the Athens Stock Exchange using panel data 
analysis an approach virtually ignored in the area of finance. 
Previous studies use cross sectional analysis of US (mainly) and UK 
data. Cross sectional analysis cannot capture such dynamic relationships as 
changes in share ownership structure. Use of panel data is very important in 
capturing changes in ownership over time. Further the potential influence of 
ownership structure on various measures of performance has been studied in 
the absence of the effect exerted upon share prices and other measures of 
performance of other important valuation variables. In this paper we have 
attempted to address some of the issues, largely ignored by previous works, 
via (i) panel data analysis, (ii) explicit share valuation models, and (iii) ap-
propriate estimation techniques.  
In addition, we depart from all past papers in that we used Chamberlain’s 
(1982) multivariate panel data method. This estimator allows one to have 
arbitrary error autocorrelation, and parameter temporal behavior. Contrary to 
previous studies using panel data, this estimator is significantly less restric-
tive. Existing implementations of panel estimators rely on the unrealistic as-
sumption that parameters are the same over time, and there is no autocorrela-
tion in the residuals, or that autocorrelation is of special form. It turns out 
that careful specification tests reveal the inadequacies of standard fixed or 
random effect estimators, and the superiority of the multivariate panel data 
method. Finally, it should be stressed that among all alternative methods of 
estimation used, only this one produced a statistically significant and econo-
metrically well specified relationship between share prices and institutional 
shareholdings.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we 
briefly review the theoretical and empirical relationships between share 
prices and the structure of stock ownership. In section 3 we set out the eco-
nomic model to be tested, while section 4 is devoted to the development of 
the appropriate statistical models. In section 5 we present and interpret the 
empirical findings while section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Theoretical constructs    
2.1 Efficient pricing of shares  
Within an efficient markets framework share prices are a function of the 
risk adjusted benefits expected from shares. Shares are priced according to 
the expected benefits and systematic risks. Influences such as those that 
might be caused by the particular ownership structure of a company can be 
thought of as belonging to the specific risk category and as such are diversi-
fied away within the CAMP framework. Under this pricing regime the pres-
ence of institutional holdings and/or blockholders is value irrelevant. All 
shareholders (both, inside and outside) are value maximisers and homogene-
ous.  
2.2 Managerial and Agency Theories 
The separation of ownership from control has given rise to the develop-
ment of managerial
3
 and agency
4 
theories. In the modern corporation the 
separation of ownership from control may lead to a divergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders. Proponents of managerial theories ar-
gue that managers use firm resources to operate the firm in their own inter-
ests. Management controlled firms are more likely to adopt non-wealth 
maximizing policies than owner controlled firms. Agency theorists distin-
guish between inside shareholders who manage the firm and outside share-
holders. Managers who do not own shares tend to act in their own interests 
adopting investment and financing policies beneficial to them and not neces-
sarily to the company shareholders. However, as management equity owner-
ship increases management and outside shareholders interests coincide. The 
central idea of these studies is that the modern corporation may be viewed as 
a coalition of various groups (managers, individual, shareholders, trade un-
ions, pension funds, mutual funds, debtholders etc.). Each group in order to 
protect its own interests monitors the management of the firm. The managers 
are viewed as a separate group with different interests from the other groups 
in the coalition. For example debtholders may opt for the acceptance of less 
risky investment projects, shareholders may press for long term performance, 
mutual funds may be interested in short term results while managers may be 
interested in the maximization of the growth of the firm. The net outcome of 
these conflicting interests will depend on the strength of the objectives of 
each group and the financial capacity to undertake the significant agency 
costs involved in pursuing this endeavor. This line of reasoning suggests that 
the issue as to the direction of the relationship between ownership structure 
and share prices can not be settled ex-ante but is essentially an empirical is-
sue. Ex-ante we could not be certain as to whether management controlled 
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firms are more value relevant than owner controlled firms
5
. Against this we 
should cite the argument that competition in the managerial labor market and 
the presence on the board of outside shareholders would limit management 
discretionary powers
6
. 
2.3 Institutional Investors and Blockholders 
Should we expect institutional investors and blockholders to be: 
short-term speculators ; or 
long-term wealth maximizing investors ;  
The first type of behavior stems from the fact that fund managers, in par-
ticular, are themselves constantly being appraised for good quarterly/yearly 
performance
7
. 
When institutional investors hold large amounts of shares of a firm, 
short-term reductions in earnings per share may cause them to sell their 
shares lest they become locked into a losing stock. These transactions will 
cause a decline in the price of the stock possibly leading up to a hostile take-
over bid. In an effort to reduce the probability of a takeover bid top managers 
may invest less in R & D projects, market development projects, manage-
ment development programs and other long-term projects. This line of 
thought would predict a negative association between share prices and insti-
tutional holdings. This kind of behavior may further be reinforced by the fact 
that a significant proportion of shares exposes the fund to a high degree of  
specific risk. This perspective points to a negative association between share 
prices and the presence of institutional shareholders. 
2.4 Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis  
According to this hypothesis
8
 institutional investors and large blockhold-
ers, unlike small individual shareholders, find it cost effective to monitor 
management behavior.  The monitoring process of management actions 
compels the high echelon of management hierarchy into adopting value 
maximizing policies. According to this hypothesis we would expect no sig-
nificant association between share prices and the presence of institutional 
investors and large blockholders. What we have therefore are various con-
flicting views and hypotheses regarding the effect of stock ownership on 
share prices. 
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2.5 Earlier Results 
Many researchers have sought to shed light on the issues stated above. 
Their results are just as conflicting as are the competitive hypotheses they 
sought to investigate. 
Regarding the issue of ownership controlled firms Short and Keasey 
(1997) found no influence on the company. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Holderness and Sheehan (1988). Leech and Leahy (1991) re-
ported opposite results in that ownership controlled firms were associated 
with higher valuation ratios whereas Thonet and Pensgen (1979) found that 
management controlled firms were associated with higher market values but 
that owner controlled firms had higher growth in total assets.      
There was no significant association between corporate value and block-
holders as found by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) Murali and Welch 
(1989) as found by Morck et al (1988). The issue of the effect of institutional 
holdings on firm performance did, (empirically), not fare any better. Whereas 
Pound (1988) and Graves (1988) report negative associations between value 
and institutional holdings and R and D and the size of institutional ownership 
respectively, Hansen and Hill (1991) found a positive association between R 
& D and institutional holdings. Two more studies found a positive associa-
tion between value/return and the proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Chagnanti and Damanpour 
(1991). 
As with all firm performance studies the results are mixed. Since the is-
sues examined empirically have important implications for portfolio man-
agement and market efficiency, new and possibly more efficient examination 
procedures  are called forth. For it is only through repeated testing with data 
from different market structures (and cultures) and different degrees of eco-
nomic development that new knowledge may be derived.    
2.6 Research Objectives  
The present paper investigates the relationship between share prices and 
equity ownership of companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE). In this paper unlike others, we use panel data analysis and apply ap-
propriate statistical techniques to measure empirical relationships. As we 
argue in section 4 panel data has a number of advantages over both cross 
section and time series data and allows us to obtain efficient and consistent 
estimates. 
Our research hypothesis is based upon the theoretical valuation models 
and managerial/organizational perspectives surveyed in section 2 of this pa-
per. Our basic empirical valuation model rests on the theoretical framework 
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developed by Ohlson (1989,1995) which is equivalent, to the dividend valua-
tion model developed by Miller and Modigliani (1961).  
3.  Share valuation models 
3.1  Τhe Economic Model 
According to Ohlson (1989, 1995), under clean surplus accounting and 
assuming that the time series behavior of abnormal accounting earnings satis-
fies a certain stochastic process, a firm's market value is determined as fol-
lows: 
 
MVt = µ A
a
t + ν EQt + φ [ ]tV                                                    (1) 
 
where: 
MVt: is the market value of the equity for period t; 
A
a
t: are the abnormal accounting earnings for period t; 
EQt: is the book value of equity for period t; 
[ ]Vt : is a vector that contains all other non- accounting value relevant 
variables not yet affecting A
α
t and EQt. 
For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that the ownership vari-
ables are included in the [Vt] and consequently we will be testing the follow-
ing version of Ohlson's model: 
 
Pt = a0 + a1A
a
t + a2 EQt + a3 POt                                             (2) 
where : 
Pt: is the common share price; 
A
a
t:  the abnormal earnings per share for period t; 
At:  the accounting earnings per share for period t; 
EQt: the book value of equity per share at the end of period t; 
Rf: the risk free rate of return at the beginning of period t; 
POt: the percentage of shares held by investment trusts and mutual 
funds at the end of period t ; 
3.2  Expected signs of the relationships      
On the basis of the above analysis and in conjunction with the discussion 
of the theoretical constructs of the managerial/agency theories we expect the 
following relationships between the variables included in the economic 
model: 
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1. 
α
dA
dP
> 0.  i.e. The greater the abnormal earnings per share the greater 
the price of a share. 
2. 
dEQ
dP
>0   i.e. The greater the book value of equity per share, the greater 
the price of a share. 
3a. 
dPO
dP
=0  Changes in the proportion of equity held by institutional 
investors have no effect on the price of a share. Apparently the market prices 
shares efficiently. 
3b.
dPO
dP
 <0. Changes in the proportion of the equity held by institu-
tional investors have a negative effect on share prices. In this case institu-
tional investors are short-term traders causing management to adopt subop-
timal policies. 
3c.
dPO
dP
>0. Changes in the proportion of the equity held by institu-
tional investors constitute a factor of value. 
Thus, our approach specifies a certain number of variables as being im-
portant determinants of share valuation and in addition it specifies the sign of 
relationships that share prices may be expected to bear towards the variables 
affecting them. 
We have, therefore, a testable hypothesis and only by resorting to em-
pirical testing will we be able to measure the response coefficients in ques-
tion. 
4. The sample  
4.1 Sample Description and Data Sources 
The sample includes 59 firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange for 
which all relevant ownership information were available for a six year period 
from 1991 to  1996 inclusive. Accounting and stock market data were taken 
from the Athens Stock Exchange database, the portfolios of the mutual funds 
and investment companies were constructed  from primary data  provided to 
us by institutional investors. Finally, the risk free rate was obtained from 
publications of the Bank of Greece. 
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4.2 Definition of Variables 
For the purpose of testing empirically the model described by equation 
(2) the dependent and independent variables included are defined as follows: 
Pt: is the common stock price six months after the end of fiscal year 
t: 
At: is the accounting earnings per share for period t. 
At
a
: represents abnormal earnings per share for period t, that 
is  At
a 
= At - RfEQt-1. At
a
 could alternatively be defined as 
pure profits, it being the difference between earnings per 
share (At) minus the opportunity cost of these earnings 
(RfEQt-1), according to Ohlson (1989,1995) and Feltham 
and Ohlson (1995) contributions. 
EQt: represents the book value of equity per share for period t. 
Rt: is the annual rate of return on one-year government bills 
at the beginning of period t. 
POt: represents the percentage of shares held by investment 
trusts and mutual funds at the end of period t. 
5.  Econometric models 
Researchers testing economic relationships analyse, as a rule, time series 
or cross section data. The main advantage of using time-series analysis is that 
it enables one to discover dynamic forces affecting the dependent variable in 
question. The main disadvantage is that time-series data may pose autocorre-
lation and multicollinearity problems. On the other hand, cross-section data 
may not pose serious problems of autocorrelation and multicollinearity but 
suffer from problems of heteroscedasticity and may not enable the researcher 
to detect dynamic forces, which may affect the dependent variable.   
    Algebraically the relationship can be represented as follows: 
T ..., 1, = t                                         
N ..., 1, = i            
1
∑
=
+++=
K
k
itkitktiit
XY εβλµ
                     (3)                     
where Yit represents the value of the dependent variable for cross-section 
i at time t, Xkit is the value of the kth explanatory variable for cross-section i 
at time t, µi is an unobserved cross-section effect, λt is an unobserved time 
effect and εit is the unobserved overall remainder. The above relationship 
may be estimated by making two assumptions; firstly that the µi and λt are 
fixed parameters and secondly that they are random. The first assumption 
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leads to the dummy variable model
9
 while the second leads to the error 
components model
10
. 
The estimation of the coefficients involves the use of a modified Aitken 
procedure consisting of two stages. In the first stage the estimate of the vari-
ance of the error components were obtained using least squares with dummy 
variables residuals, a method proposed by Amemiya (1971), while in the 
second stage use is made of the familiar generalized least squares estimator: 
One problem with the fixed-effects or random-effects formulations is 
that although the intercept β1it is assumed to vary over individuals and/or 
time, a parameter constancy assumption is made regarding the remaining 
parameters. This is usual practice in applied econometrics.  
The SUR model applied to panel data was proposed by Chamberlain 
(1982), and does not make restrictive assumptions about the autocorrelation 
of error terms, since it accommodates arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation. It 
also does not make restrictive assumptions about inter-temporal parameter 
stability as all parameters (or, of course, subsets of the parameter vector) can 
be time varying without restrictions on the pattern of inter-temporal varia-
tion. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests can be devised in a straightforward 
manner to test that certain parameters are constant over time, and / or serial 
correlation is absent. All these features are quite important over the more 
restrictive fixed- or random-effect treatments. 
    Formally, the specification is given by the following: 
∑
=
+⋅=
K
k 1
itkitktit
ε XβY                         (8) 
to capture the idea that model parameters vary over time. 
Writing (8) as 
(1x1)
it
)1(
t
)1(
it
)11(
it ε  βX'Y +⋅=
kxxkx
                         (9) 
where 
it
Χ′ = [X1it  X2it … Xkit], and stacking all cross-section observa-
tions for a given time period, we obtain:  
(Nx1)
t
)1(
t
)N(
t
)1N(
t ε  βXY +⋅=
kxxkx
                t=1...T                       (10) 
     This model can be estimated using SUR. For purposes of estimation, 
the SHAZAM computer program has been used. Notice that the standard 
assumption in SUR estimation is ),0(~ ΣN
t
ε . In this case, the covariance 
matrix Σ  measures the correlations of 
t
ε ’s implying that no prior restric-
tions are placed on the autocorrelation of error terms. Similarly, by estimat-
ing different βt ‘s no restrictions are placed on the temporal behavior of re-
gression parameters.  
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6. Empirical findings  
6.1 Diagnostic Tests For O.L.S. 
As an initial step we present results of a number of diagnostic tests for 
Ordinary Least Shares (O.L.S.) (TABLE-1-). As can be seen from table 1, 
O.L.S. estimates seem to be associated with several problems such as: (i) 
non-normality in the equations for 1993-96, based on results of the Jarque-
Bera test, (ii) heteroscedasticity for 1991 and 1993 (Breusch -Pagan and Gle-
jser tests), (iii) functional form misspecification for 1991,1992 and 1996 
(Ramsey test), and (iv) cross-section parameter instability as evidenced by 
the Chow break-point test. For these tests, see Greene (1997). 
Although (ii) could be attributed to (i) and (iii) to (iv) the fact that test 
statistics reject so often the null hypothesis implies that O.L.S. estimates are 
unsatisfactory. For this reason we have decided to use random- effect model 
(RE) and SUR estimation in order to obtain better estimates. We consider it 
very important that the RESET test rejects the null hypothesis of correct 
functional specification. This finding accords well with findings reported in 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) ac-
cording to which the relationship should be curvilinear. 
6.2 Diagnostic Tests For Alternative Estimating Techniques 
Next we performed diagnostic tests for alternative estimating techniques 
(TABLE-2-). 
The most interesting finding in table 2 is the statistically significant 
Ramsey misspecification tests for POLS (Pooling Least Squares), LSDV 
(Least Squares with Dummy Variables), and RE (Random Effect) equations, 
for 1991,1992 and 1996. On the other hand, SUR estimation seems to be free 
from Ramsey- type functional form misspecification. Corroborating evidence 
is provided by the sequential break-point Chow (1960) test which indicates 
parameter instability for 1991 and 1992 for all estimating methods except 
SUR. We take this as evidence in favor of  SUR and against POLS, LSDV 
and RE estimators. Since the RESET test is quite general (the alternative 
hypothesis includes a variety of possible nonlinear models) we take this as 
evidence that POLS, LSDV, and RE are not correctly specified as one would 
expect from the evidence in McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck, 
Schleifer and Vishny (1988). However, the SUR model does not suffer from 
functional form misspecification problems implying that we need not worry 
about a possibly curvilinear or more generally about a nonlinear relationship. 
Turning now to heteroscedasticity, we have conflicting results: Although 
Harvey's  
2
)3(Χ statistic finds no evidence in favor of heteroscedasticity, the 
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Breusch and Pagan  
2
)3(Χ statistic supports heteroscedasticity for 1991 and 
1993 in connection with POLS,LSDV and RE (but not SUR). The conflict 
among the tests may be resolved by noting that heteroscedasticity could be of 
the form
tt
t uXu +=
∧
γ'
2
 rather than log 
tt
t uXu +=
∧
γ'
2
. It is, however, 
interesting that neither the Breusch and Pagan  nor the Harvey  tests reject 
heteroscedasticity for the SUR equations. 
Non-normality is a common problem across estimating techniques. 
However, the Jarque and Bera 
2
)2(Χ  test, although significant, is significantly 
lower, across years, compared to the values of the Jarque-Bera statistic for 
POLS,LSDV and RE. 
Overall, it appears that functional form misspecification, heteroscedastic-
ity, non-normality and parameter instability problems either completely dis-
appear or become considerably less important when SUR is used. Based on 
this evidence we may conclude that SUR appears to be superior in terms of 
specification.  
6.3 Empirical Results  
Empirical results are reported in table 3. For POLS, LSDV, RE the coef-
ficients are assumed time-invariant and the relevant parameter estimates as 
well as t-statistics are reported in the column with the heading ''1991''. 
The last column (with heading ''pooling /SUR'') reports results for the 
SUR model assuming all coefficients are time invariant. It has been shown in 
connection with likelihood ratio tests that this model can be rejected in favor 
of a SUR model with all parameters being time-varying (with the exception 
of PO). Results for this model are reported in the row headed ''SUR''. 
(i) Coefficients of A
a
 
Our results are in accordance with our a priori expectations. Parameters 
corresponding to A
a
 are generally positive, ranging from 1.97(LSDV) to 3.84 
(POLS) , and they are highly statistically significant. SUR results show that 
this parameter shows high dynamic variation ,ranging from 0.78 (1995) to 
2.85 (1991). It is interesting that t-statistics drop from an average of 6.0 for 
the period 1991-1993 to about 2.0 for the 1995-96 period. 
(ii) Coefficients of EQ 
In general this finding accords with the sign of our economic relation-
ship. These coefficients are positive and (with the exception of LSDV) statis-
tically significant. According to ''SUR'' there exists a clear downward trend 
with an accompanying reduction in t-statistics. It is interesting that according 
to pooled OLS and SUR , estimates are greater than one. According to 
LSDV,RE and pooled/SUR the coefficients are less than one. 
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(iii) Coefficients of PO 
It may be recalled that we had identified three alternative perspectives 
pointing to a different relationship between share prices and the size of insti-
tutional holdings. PO seems to have a positive effect only according to 
pooled OLS. All other estimating techniques agree that this effect is nega-
tive. Both LSDV and RE imply that this effect is statistically insignificant. 
SUR (and pooling/SUR to lesser extent) on the other hand, imply a statisti-
cally significant effect. The relevant estimates are -1437.9 (-2.51) for SUR 
and -1131.5 (-1.98) for pooling/SUR. Of course, the negative contribution of 
PO implies that institutional investors are short-term traders, see (3b) in sec-
tion 3.2. 
We attribute this difference to the much satisfactory behavior of SUR in 
terms of values of the diagnostic statistics. Although in general, pooled OLS 
seems to give the lowest standard errors, the assumption that coefficients are 
time invariant is at odds with the data (see diagnostics in table 1). Utilizing 
this information is crucial in dealing with the misspecification problems im-
plied by the constant coefficient assumptions. The gain materializes in much 
lower standard errors for EQ and PO. 
The finding that the coefficient of PO is very close to statistical signifi-
cance in pooling/SURE should not escape our attention. In this model, coef-
ficients are also time invariant (as in POLS, LSDV, and SUR).This does not 
constitute a contradiction because (contrary to all other estimating tech-
niques) both SUR and pooled SUR deal non-parametrically with the problem 
of auto-correlation (via the Σ  matrix). This gives pooled SUR  a t-statistic of 
-1.98 for PO, compared to 0.36 for POLS, -0.32 for RE and 1.62 for LSDV. 
The additional feature of SUR (abolition of parameter constancy assumption) 
further raises the t-statistic to -2.51 and moves the estimate downwards to  -
1437.9 (compared to -1131.5 for pooled SUR, -213.9 for RE, -1024.0 for 
LSDV and 262.8 for pooled OLS). 
It may be noted that further support for the SUR model is provided by 
values of the R
2
 statistic. This statistic is 0.936 for SUR, compared to 0.580 
for POLS, 0.836 for LSDV 0.799 for RE and 0.737 for pooled SUR. Relying 
on our SUR results we could conclude that institutional investors appear to 
be short-term traders influencing negatively share prices. 
7. Conclusions 
We set out to investigate whether institutional holdings exert an inde-
pendent influence on share prices. We used data from companies quoted on 
the Athens Stock Exchange, a market which, for some, is considered to be 
emerging whereas, for others, is already considered to be a developed stock 
market.  
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As to our main variable of interest, PO, we should stress the following. 
Based on LSDV and/or RE estimation this variable is value irrelevant that is 
insignificant. On the other hand, SUR estimation provides a statistically sig-
nificant (as well as econometrically well specified) negative relationship. 
This result may be attributed to the restrictive assumptions about parameter 
temporal behavior made by LSDV and RE. Since SUR allows for an arbi-
trary pattern and seems to be free of functional misspecification problems the 
results obtained by SUR are more reliable.  
Chamberlain’s (1982) multivariate approach to estimating the economic 
relationships seems to be justified on empirical grounds. Among all alterna-
tive methods of estimation, only this method produced results in accordance 
with our expectations. Overall we could, therefore, argue that institutional 
investors appear to be investing for short periods of time, moving in and out 
of shares according to short-term results. This speculative behavior may 
compel management to cancel long-term financial policies resulting thus in 
future lower prices.  
Notes 
1. A large number of papers have been written on the subject matter of 
empirical valuation models see for instance Keenan (1970) and Kara-
thanassis and Philippas (1988) 
2. For an excellent review and critical appraisal of the relevant literature 
see Short (1994) 
3. Williamson  (1964). 
4. Marris (1964). “The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism” Mac-
Millan  
5. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
6. Fama (1980)  Demsetz (1983) 
7. Drucker (1987).  
8. Pound (1988) 
9. The well known covariance analysis, which in the past had been used 
extensively in the area of production function. See Mundlak (1963) and 
Hock (1962).  
10. Wallace and Hussain (1969) 
11. Mundlak (1978) and Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
12. For a number of variations of the error components model see Baltagi 
(1995).  
13. Standard  LR tests of parameter constancy indicate that all parameters 
(except the coefficient of PO) are time variant.  Detailed tests are avail-
able upon request.   
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